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 LAW SUMMARY 
No Less a Victim: A Call to Governor Nixon 
to Grant Clemency to Two Missouri Women 
KRISTEN L. STALLION* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Approximately one in three women in the United States will fall victim 
to domestic violence in her lifetime.1  In recent years, an intimate partner 
killed approximately thirty-nine percent of female homicide victims in the 
United States;2 an intimate partner only killed 2.8% of male homicide vic-
tims.3  Battered Woman Syndrome (“BWS”) has received broad recognition 
in an effort to help factfinders better understand how battered women per-
ceive their relationships, and opportunities for escape from abuse, as well as 
reactions to the cycle of violence.  Before the introduction of expert testimo-
ny regarding BWS was admissible at trial, women who killed their partners 
were unable to plead self-defense and often pled guilty or claimed an im-
paired mental state defense.4 
Today, the majority of states recognize the necessity of BWS expert tes-
timony and permit expert testimony regarding battering and its effects.5  Mis-
souri fist codified the use of BWS evidence to bolster a woman’s claim of 
self-defense in 1987 with the passage of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
563.033.6  Since that time, many women sought to introduce BWS evidence 
in support of a theory of self-defense.  Two of these women included Donna 
Biernacki and Amelia Bird, Missouri inmates who were unable to present 
 
* B.S., Missouri State University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I am grate-
ful to Professor Mary Beck for her insight, guidance, and support and the Missouri 
Law Review for its assistance in the writing and editing of this Note. 
 1. Shannan Catalano et al., Female Victims of Violence, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1, 
2 (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvv.pdf. 
 2. SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993–2011, at 1, 3 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, V. Bat-
tered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1577–78 (1993) 
[hereinafter Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers]. 
 5. Id. at 1592. 
 6. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 2016). 
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BWS evidence in order to mitigate their harsh sentences after killing their 
abusers.7 
While expert testimony regarding BWS should serve as a benefit to bat-
tered women, its admissibility is subject to the trial judge’s vast discretion 
and the jury’s perception.  Several women, like Donna and Amelia, have re-
ceived harsh sentences for retaliation against their abusers; the BWS testimo-
ny that actually was presented on their behalf provided no mitigation.  Clem-
ency, an executive power that allows the governor to mitigate disparities in 
criminal punishment, is a proper exercise of executive discretion to counter-
act the wrongs of Missouri trial courts.  Governor Nixon should grant Donna 
and Amelia, as well as many unnamed others, clemency for both the judici-
ary’s misunderstanding of the admissibility of BWS evidence and its neglect 
to treat battered women as victims of domestic violence. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
While psychologist Lenore Walker first defined BWS in 1979, many 
courts did not immediately admit expert testimony regarding BWS.8  Section 
563.033 was not adopted until 1987 and was infrequently utilized by trial 
court judges.  Trial court judges’ discretion, in turn, led to the need for gover-
nors to exercise clemency in order to mitigate battered women’s harsh prison 
sentences. 
A.  The History and Recognition of Battered Woman Syndrome 
The theory of BWS was first developed in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.9  The psychological theory is often credited to Lenore Walker, a clini-
cal and forensic psychologist whose book, The Battered Woman Syndrome, 
coined the term.10  Walker conducted a large empirical study to identify 
whether certain patterns or behaviors were present in abusive relationships.11  
Walker was able to identify several common factors in abusive relationships 
and developed BWS as a means of defining the behavioral traits of women 
who suffer from continued abuse.12  Studies regarding BWS and battering 
 
 7. See infra Part III.A; see also infra Part III.B. 
 8. See generally LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
(1st ed. 1979). 
 9. Jessica Savage, Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 761, 761 
(2006). 
 10. LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (3d ed. 2009); 
see Lauren Champaign, Battered Woman Syndrome, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 59, 60 
(2010). 
 11. PATRICIA GAGNÉ, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE: THE MOVEMENT FOR 
CLEMENCY AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 18 (1998). 
 12. Id. at 19. 
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relationships have provided an explanation as to why some women choose to 
remain with their abusive partners.13 
In defining BWS, Walker encapsulated the signs and symptoms of 400 
women who were surveyed after having been “physically, sexually, and/or 
psychologically abused in an intimate relationship.”14  Walker’s tension-
reduction theory identified three distinct phases in the “Cycle Theory of Vio-
lence” of battering relationships.15  The first of these cycles, the “tension-
building” phase, occurs when a woman experiences a minimal amount of 
physical and verbal attacks from her partner.16  Because she views the attacks 
as relatively minor, the woman tends to minimize the significance of the at-
tacks and attempts to conciliate her attacking partner.17  The woman often 
blames herself for the abuse and may take it upon herself to rationalize the 
acts of her partner.18  The “tension-building” phase may last for a number of 
years while the woman continues to rationalize the acts of her partner and 
begins to behave in a way that she believes will help her avoid future at-
tacks.19  Tension will gradually escalate and increase friction in the relation-
ship.20 
Next comes the “acute battering incident” phase.21  The severity of the 
attacks will intensify as the tension in the first phase of the cycle results in an 
uncontrollable discharge of violence.22  The minor incidents at the onset of 
the “tension-building phase” become more frequent and intensify to the point 
that the woman can no longer appease her partner.23  As the cycle repeats, the 
woman may be able to predict the approach of the acute battering phase and 
take steps to shield herself from verbal or physical barrages.24  The violence 
may become so severe that the woman begins to fear substantial physical 
injury or even death.25  
 
 13. Champaign, supra note 10, at 59. 
 14. WALKER, supra note 10, at 41–42. 
 15. Id. at 91. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 94. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Champaign, supra note 10.  A woman’s partner often commits “psychologi-
cal battering” in the battering phase.  Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s 
Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1205–07 (1993).  Psychological battering may consist of 
isolation and intimidation, as well as attempts to control the woman by using her 
children or by economic means.  Id. at 1205–06. 
 24. WALKER, supra note 10, at 94. 
 25. Champaign, supra note 10, at 61. 
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The third stage in the cycle of violence occurs immediately after the 
acute battering phase and is known as the “honeymoon phase.”26  The wom-
an’s partner begins to show remorse, as well as what Walker identifies as 
“contrite loving behavior.”27  Her partner will beg her for forgiveness, prom-
ise to never hurt her physically or verbally again, and will resolve to change 
his ways forevermore.28  He will be charming and apologetic and eventually 
convince the woman that he is indeed a changed man.29  He may make an 
effort to convince her that his promises are sincere by temporarily giving up 
alcohol or by looking into counseling or anger management classes.30  The 
woman’s partner essentially models himself into the man the woman wants 
him to be and gives her genuine hope that he will change.31  By the time the 
woman begins to realize her partner has made a series of empty promises, it is 
too late – the cycle of violence has restarted its course.32  As the relationship 
continues, the time spent in the “tension-building” phase increases, and the 
period of loving contrition in the “honeymoon phase” decreases.33 
And thus the (almost) never-ending cycle of a battering relationship.  
Walker argued that the repetition of the cycle of violence allows women to 
develop “learned helplessness.”34  Psychologist Martin Seligman first intro-
duced learned helplessness as a psychological state of mind that may help 
explain why some women do not leave their abusive partners.35  Walker re-
formed this definition to describe a woman losing “the ability to predict that 
what [she does] will make a particular outcome occur.”36  Walker stated that, 
after being harmed and lied to time after time, women might begin to believe 
they lack any sort of control in their relationship and in the abuse they often 
become subject to.37  Because the woman feels as if there is no way out of her 
situation, “the woman becomes increasingly passive, and her motivation and 
the will to get out of the relationship diminish.”38  This feeling, along with 
her partner’s continued efforts to control and isolate the woman, may lead her 
to circumvent her support system or to become willfully blind to avenues of 
escape.39  Eventually, the woman will feel as if it is impossible to escape her 
abusive partner.40 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id.; see, e.g., Savage, supra note 9, at 762. 
 29. See Champaign, supra note 10, at 61. 
 30. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 10, at 94–95. 
 31. GAGNÉ, supra note 11, at 19. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See WALKER, supra note 10, at 98. 
 34. Id. at 8–9, 44, 69–84. 
 35. Savage, supra note 9, at 762. 
 36. WALKER, supra note 10, at 69. 
 37. Savage, supra note 9, at 762. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Champaign, supra note 10, at 61. 
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B.  Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense in Missouri 
Evidence of BWS may be introduced at a trial to: (1) support the wom-
an’s credibility by eliminating commonly held misconceptions about battered 
women and abusive intimate relationships; (2) prove the woman honestly 
feared imminent death or great bodily injury; and (3) show that the woman’s 
behavior was reasonable.41  Evidence of BWS demonstrates to judges and 
juries the major impact continuous abuse has on the woman’s state of mind 
and helps to explain how actions that do not appear to coincide with tradi-
tional confrontational self-defense may in fact be justifiable.42 
1.  Codification of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Presently, every state permits expert testimony on BWS to support a 
woman’s claim of self-defense against her abusive partner.43  Several states, 
including Missouri, have codified its use.44  Prior to the passage of Section 
563.033, the majority of women who killed their batterers had no self-defense 
claim.45  Many women who killed their abusers pled guilty or asserted some 
sort of mental deficiency defense, such as insanity or diminished capacity.46 
In Missouri, a person is permitted to use physical force against another 
when, and to the extent, she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to 
defend herself from what “she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful force by [another] person.”47  Self-defense instructions re-
sulted in little relief to women because few factfinders appreciated the immi-
nence of unlawful force – battered women “often perceive an immediate 
threat where a factfinder, uninformed about the dynamics of abuse, would be 
unlikely to see the threat as urgent.”48 
Section 563.033 was adopted in 1987 in an effort to allow battered 
women to present evidence of battered spouse syndrome, a synonym of BWS, 
at trial in order to support their claim of self-defense.49  The sponsor of the 
bill, Representative Michael Davis, noted that one intention of the bill was to 
 
 41. Savage, supra note 9, at 763. 
 42. Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 321 (1992). 
 43. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of 
Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004). 
 44. See id.; see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 2016).  The majority of 
states leave the admissibility of BWS expert testimony to judicial discretion.  Bat-
tered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1585. 
 45. See Bridget B. Romero et al., The Missouri Battered Women’s Clemency 
Coalition: A Collaborative Effort in Justice for Eleven Missouri Women, 23 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 193, 216 (2004). 
 46. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1578. 
 47. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 48. Romero et al., supra note 45. 
 49. § 563.031.1. 
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remove “the decision whether to admit expert testimony on ‘battered spouse 
syndrome’ from the trial judge’s discretion where the defendant raises the 
claim of self-defense.”50  Pursuant to Section 563.033, a woman must file 
written notice with the trial court if she chooses to present expert testimony 
regarding BWS.51  Section 563.033 makes evidence that a woman was “suf-
fering from battered spouse syndrome . . . admissible upon the issue of 
whether the [woman] lawfully acted in self defense . . . .”52 
In the years after its passage, Section 563.033 was infrequently used.53  
In 1992, the General Assembly passed a resolution urging trial courts to 
properly incorporate and implement the statute.54  The resolution stated that 
expert evidence concerning BWS should be admissible so that factfinders can 
better understand the woman’s behavior.55  Despite its codification for nearly 
thirty years, Section 563.033 has had a delayed effect in the mitigation of 
prison sentences battered women receive. 
2.  Case Law Implementing Section 563.033 
While Section 563.033 was passed with the intent to remove the trial 
court’s discretion in determining whether to admit BWS testimony in support 
of a self-defense claim, trial court judges often elected to not implement the 
statute.  This is apparent in State v. Williams and State v. Edwards, where the 
respective trial court judges declined to admit BWS expert testimony to sup-
port two battered women’s self-defense claims. 
a.  State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
In 1990, three years after Section 563.033 was signed into law, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District reversed Donna F. Williams’s 
twenty-year sentence.56  Donna killed Joel Robinson by running him over 
with her car as she fled from her boyfriend, Louis Teague.57  At trial, Donna’s 
defense counsel presented evidence of Donna and Louis’s ongoing relation-
ship.58  The relationship was marked by as many as seventeen occasions 
where Louis beat Donna, including a kick to Donna’s stomach while she was 
 
 50. Kathee Rebernak Brewer, Note, Missouri’s New Law on ‘Battered Spouse 
Syndrome:’ A Moral Victory, a Partial Solution, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 227, 239–40, 
239 n.98 (1988). 
 51. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.2 (West 2016). 
 52. Id. § 563.033.1. 
 53. See Romero et al., supra note 45, at 217. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (citing H.R. 89, 102d Cong. (Mo. 1992)). 
 56. State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 57. Id. at 310. 
 58. Id. at 309. 
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pregnant with Louis’s child.59  Several of the beatings required medical 
treatment and police were called on multiple occasions.60 
On April 22, 1988, Donna went to Joel’s home looking for Louis after 
discovering Louis did not pick up their daughter from the babysitter.61  When 
Donna arrived at Joel’s home, she and Louis began to argue.62  Louis hit 
Donna in the face and knocked her down the front steps of Joel’s home.63  He 
then hit her again while she lay on the ground.64  The strikes knocked Don-
na’s glasses off of her face.65 
Without putting her glasses back on, Donna ran to her vehicle, hysterical 
and crying.66  While Donna was attempting to back out of Joel’s driveway, 
Louis charged her vehicle.67  Donna pulled out of the driveway, hit the vehi-
cle in front of her, and then noticed a body lying in the street.68  Donna, re-
calling Louis’s statement that he would kill her if she ever hurt him, made a 
U-turn and drove over the body to prevent whom she thought was Louis from 
following through with his threat.69  Unbeknownst to Donna, Joel had run 
into the street as she pulled out of the driveway.70  Joel then stumbled into the 
street and died after Donna drove over his body.71 
Before trial, Donna filed a notice of intent to offer evidence that she suf-
fered from BWS and acted in self-defense.72  The trial court refused Donna’s 
request, finding that evidence of BWS was inadmissible because Donna was 
not Louis’s spouse.73  The trial court did accept that Donna suffered from 
BWS; however, it did not offer an instruction on self-defense or manslaugh-
ter.74 
In its analysis, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
noted that although Section 563.033 refers to a battered “spouse,” application 
of the statute was not dependent on the marital status of the defendant seeking 
to utilize it.75  The statutory language of Section 563.033 refers to an actor 
“‘suffering from the battered spouse syndrome[,]’ . . . a specific medical or 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 309–10. 
 62. Id. at 310. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  This notice was filed pursuant to Section 563.033.  Id. (citing MO. REV. 
STAT. § 563.033 (Supp. 1989)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 311. 
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emotional condition bearing certain identifiable characteristics and arising 
from a specific source.”76  When evidence of BWS is presented, it noted, “the 
evidence is to be weighed by the jury in light of how the reasonable battered 
woman would have perceived and reacted in view of the prolonged history of 
physical abuse.”77  The court held that “[t]o the degree that [a defendant’s] 
‘battered syndrome’ constitutes a consideration in a self-defense defense 
claim it applies equally whether [the defendant] is married or not.”78 
b.  State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
In 2001, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed 
Larna Edwards’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter, because the trial 
court erroneously instructed the jury on self-defense and the impact of 
BWS.79  Larna’s husband verbally and physically abused her since their mar-
riage in 1953.80  Coworkers, family members, and acquaintances of Larna 
testified at trial that they often saw her with black eyes and bruises on her 
face and arms.81 
On July 23, 1996, Larna and her husband purchased a vehicle at a car 
dealership.82  The two argued about the purchase.83  Larna’s husband pushed 
her and struck her with a solid object.84  Larna feared her husband would kill 
her.85  The next morning, Larna’s husband again argued about the vehicle 
purchase at their store.86  Larna’s husband struck her arm with a lead pipe.87  
The look in his eyes made Larna certain he would kill her.88  Larna picked up 
a handgun that was kept under the store counter for security, shot, and killed 
her husband.89 
In its opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
highlighted the four elements of self-defense under Missouri Revised Statutes 
Section 563.031: (1) absence of provocation or aggression on the part of the 
defender; (2) the defender has a reasonable belief that deadly force was nec-
essary to protect herself against an immediate danger of death; (3) the de-
fender has reasonable cause for that belief; and (4) an attempt by the defender 
 
 76. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting § 563.033.2). 
 77. Id. at 312–13 (emphasis added) (Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 
772 (Pa. 1989)). 
 78. Id. at 312. 
 79. State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 80. Id. at 605. 
 81. Id. at 606. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 607. 
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to do all within her power, consistent with her own personal safety, to avoid 
danger and the need to take a life.90  The court recognized that BWS had 
gained substantial scientific acceptance in the last twenty years.91  “While 
evidence of the battered spouse syndrome is not in and of itself a defense to a 
murder charge,” it noted, “its function is to aid the jury in determining wheth-
er a defendant’s fear and claim of self-defense are reasonable.”92 
The Edwards court corrected the Eastern District’s “reasonable battered 
woman” standard in Williams and held that if a jury believes a defendant is 
suffering from BWS, “it must weigh the evidence in light of how an other-
wise reasonable person who is suffering from battered spouse syndrome 
would have perceived and reacted in view of the prolonged history of physi-
cal abuse.”93  The court highlighted that a reasonable and prudent person does 
not act and react in the same way as a person suffering from a prolonged his-
tory of physical abuse.94 
C.  Clemency Power in Missouri 
Clemency is a broad term that refers to the ability of an executive offi-
cial to exercise his or her discretion in mitigating disparities in criminal pun-
ishment.95  Clemency may take several forms, including: amnesty,96 commu-
tation,97 pardon,98 remission of fines and forfeitures,99 and reprieve.100  Clem-
ency is a power given to the President of the United States and to governors 
of the states as one of the checks and balances on the other branches of gov-
ernment: the executive has the ability to mitigate the effects of an inflexible 
or harsh law passed by the legislature or to correct mistakes that may have 
 
 90. Id. at 612. 
 91. Id. at 612–13. 
 92. Id. at 613. 
 93. Compare id. at 615 (emphasis added), with State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 
308, 312–13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 94. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d at 615. 
 95. See generally Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy 
Analysis of a Governor’s Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated 
Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 25–28 (1994). 
 96. Id. at 25.  Amnesty is an act of forgiveness to a class of persons guilty of a 
political offense.  Id. 
 97. Id.  Commutations reduce a defendant’s original sentence to a lesser degree 
of punishment.  Id. 
 98. Id.  Pardons either completely forgive the defendant of the crime and conse-
quences of her conviction or require certain conditions be met before or after the 
pardon is granted.  Id. 
 99. Id.  A remission of fines and forfeitures releases someone from their debts.  
Id. 
 100. Id.  Reprieves postpone scheduled executions.  Id. 
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been made by the judiciary.101  While the number of women incarcerated for 
killing their batterer in self-defense is unknown, it has been estimated that at 
least 124 battered women from twenty-three states, including Missouri, have 
received some form of clemency since 1978.102  The majority of these women 
received a grant of clemency after 1990.103 
Article IV, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution empowers the gover-
nor with the ability to “grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after con-
viction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment.”104  The 
Board of Probation and Parole first investigates all clemency applications and 
then refers its findings and a nonbinding recommendation to the governor.105  
The decision whether to grant or deny clemency is left entirely to the discre-
tion of the governor.106 
The five Missouri governors prior to the Nixon administration collec-
tively granted clemency 160 times.107  Eleven of the 160 grants were to incar-
cerated survivors of domestic violence.108  Governor Nixon has granted clem-
ency fifteen times in his two-term administration – when he commuted the 
death sentence of Richard Clay to life in prison in 2011 and when he granted 
pardons to nine non-violent offenders in December 2014, as well as five other 
non-violent offenders in May 2015.109 
 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Linda L. Ammons, Why Do You Do the 
Things You Do? Clemency for Battered Incarcerated Women, A Decade’s Review, 11 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 533, 542 (2003). 
 102. See Battered Women Who Have Received Clemency, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE 
FOR DEF. BATTERED WOMEN (2002), http://www.cybergrrl.com/planet/dv/stat/
statbwkill.html; see also Carol Jacobsen et al., Battered Women, Homicide Convic-
tions, and Sentencing: The Case for Clemency, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 56 
(2007). 
 103. See Jacobsen et al., supra note 102. 
 104. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
 105. Romero et al., supra note 45, at 214–25. 
 106. See Roll v. Carnahan, 225 F.3d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 107. Jennifer S. Mann, New Coalition Urges Clemency for 14 Missouri Women in 
Prison, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 28, 2014, 11:15 PM), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/new-coalition-urges-clemency-for-
missouri-women-in-prison/article_66311de9-549b-5f51-90a6-10811a19bd8b.html.  
The five governors before Governor Nixon include: Matt Blunt, Bob Holden, Roger 
Wilson, Mel Carnahan, and John Ashcroft.  See Missouri: Past Governors Bios, 
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (2011), http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-
governors-bios/page_missouri.html.  They are both Democrats and Republicans.  Id. 
 108. Victoria Law, It’s Time to Bring Domestic Violence Survivors Like Barbara 
Sheehan Home from Prison, NATION (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/
article/193809/its-time-bring-domestic-violence-survivors-barbara-sheehan-home-
prison#. 
 109. See Mann, supra note 107; Gov. Nixon Grants Pardons to Nine Non-Violent 
Offenders, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR JAY NIXON (Dec. 29, 2014), https://governor.mo.gov/
news/archive/gov-nixon-grants-pardons-nine-non-violent-offenders; Gov. Nixon 
Grants Pardons to Five Non-Violent Offenders, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR JAY NIXON 
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In 2007, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued writs of mandamus to 
Shirley Lute and Lynda Branch after Governor Holden granted the two wom-
en clemency in 2004.110  Shirley and Lynda were each convicted of murder-
ing their abusive husbands and received sentences of life in prison without 
the possibility of parole.111  The Missouri Board of Probation and Parole de-
nied parole to the women, arguing that “[r]elease at [that] time would depre-
ciate the seriousness of the . . . offense.”112 
Shirley Lute’s son killed Shirley’s husband on February 6, 1978.113  
Shirley was arrested and charged for the murder, yet continuously maintained 
her innocence.114  Over the course of their marriage, Shirley’s husband con-
tinuously struck her, bit her breasts, bent her fingers back so that she would 
comply with his sexual demands, and put a dog collar on her and made her 
bark like a dog.115  Virtually no evidence was presented regarding the long 
history of abuse Shirley suffered, and no BWS expert testimony was present-
ed at trial.116 
Lynda Branch shot her husband two times after she told him she was 
leaving him.117  After an evening of intense arguing with her husband, Lynda 
was finally able to fall asleep.118  When she awoke, she saw her husband 
pointing a gun at her while he slept.119  Lynda struggled for the gun and her 
husband awoke.120  As the two struggled, the gun went off and shot her hus-
band.121  Her husband was shot again as Lynda tried to remove the gun from 
under the sheets of their bed.122  A jury found Lynda guilty of murder in the 
first degree after a trial where Lynda’s defense counsel did not introduce evi-
dence of her horrific abuse.123  Prior to this evening, Lynda’s husband caused 
her to suffer a miscarriage after an attack, shot at her, cut her with a knife on 
 
(May 22, 2015), https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-grants-pardons-
five-non-violent-offenders-commutes-jeffrey-mizanskey (Governor Nixon stated, 
“The executive power to grant clemency is one I take with a great deal of considera-
tion and seriousness.”). 
 110. State ex rel. Lute v. Mo. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 218 S.W.3d 431, 437 
(Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 111. Id. at 432–33. 
 112. Id. at 433–34. 
 113. Id. at 433. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  Section 563.033 was enacted six years after Lute’s conviction on June 
11, 1981.  Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1987)). 
 117. Id. at 434. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 435. 
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numerous occasions, cracked her ribs, locked her in closets, and put a lit can-
dle in her vagina.124   
In issuing its writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted 
that the governor, as head of the executive branch, has the power to commute 
and pardon criminal convictions.125  In interpreting the governor’s commuta-
tions, courts are to give effect to the governor’s intent.126  Because the power 
to grant clemency is a “matter of grace,” the governor can exercise “upon 
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may think 
proper,” deference is given to the governor.127  Governor Holden filed sworn 
affidavits in both women’s cases, eliminating any doubt as to his intent in 
granting clemency.128  The court reasoned that Governor Holden would not 
have recommended the two women for parole, after considering the facts of 
their cases, if he considered the offenses to be too serious to warrant clemen-
cy.129 
Perhaps one of the most notable events for incarcerated domestic vio-
lence survivors in Missouri came in 2010 when Vicky Williams, Roberta 
Carlene Borden, and Ruby Jamerson were granted clemency and released 
from prison on parole.130  The Missouri Battered Women’s Clemency Coali-
tion argued for the women’s release for over a decade, arguing that the wom-
en only killed their husbands after suffering from years of horrific abuse.131  
At the time the women were incarcerated, the Coalition argued, evidence of 
domestic violence was rarely presented at trial and was not well understood 
by juries or judges.132  The Board of Probation and Parole granted the women 
a parole hearing after Missouri Revised Statutes Section 217.692.1 was 
passed in 2007.133  Section 217.692.1 allows a prisoner serving a sentence of 
life with no parole for fifty years or serving life without parole to be parole-
eligible after serving fifteen years of their sentence.134  The prisoner must also 
have a “history of being a victim of continual and substantial physical or sex-
ual domestic violence that was not presented as an affirmative defense at 
trial.”135 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (quoting Ex parte Reno, 66 Mo. 266, 273 (1877)). 
 128. Id. at 436. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Stephen Deere, Three Missouri Women Who Killed Husbands to be Paroled, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 13, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/three-missouri-women-who-killed-husbands-to-be-
paroled/article_36d9e322-bf5d-11df-8bbf-0017a4a78c22.html. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.692.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 135. Id. 
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III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In October 2014, the newly-formed Community Coalition for Clemency 
petitioned Governor Nixon to grant clemency to fourteen incarcerated women 
convicted of various crimes.136  Each of the fourteen women has a history of 
abuse as children or adults and has no history of crime before their convic-
tions.137  The coalition includes former Governor Bob Holden, former appel-
late judge James R. Dowd, the St. Louis University Legal Clinic, the 
WILLOW138 project at Webster University, and several lawmakers and pri-
vate attorneys.139  Of the fourteen women who clemency is petitioned for, 
nine had no direct involvement in the violent crimes they were accused of 
committing, and the five other women only acted after years of egregious 
abuse.140  Two of these women are Donna Biernacki and Amelia Bird. 
A.  Donna Biernacki 
On December 2, 2004, Donna Biernacki left her home with a loaded gun 
in hand, intending to commit suicide after days of fighting with her hus-
band.141  Donna was abused throughout her marriage – her husband choked 
her, pulled her around the house by her hair, and persistently hit her with his 
fists.142  Additionally, Donna’s husband sexually abused her and her four 
daughters.143  Donna eventually returned home on December 2.144  When she 
returned, her husband revealed that he would place her in total isolation – 
Donna’s mother and father could not visit their home, their fifteen-year-old 
daughter would be forced to move out, and he would control every cent of the 
family’s finances.145  Donna put the loaded gun up to her own head and pre-
pared to kill herself.146  Donna’s husband encouraged her threatened suicide 
 
 136. Mann, supra note 107. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; The Women Institute Legal Lifelines for Other Women (“WILLOW”) 
Project is a nonprofit organization that provides legal assistance to women.  The 
WILLOW Project, WEBSTER U., http://www.webster.edu/arts-and-sciences/affiliates-
events/willow-project.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 139. Mann, supra note 107. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Stephanie Francis Ward, Working for Free: Lawyers Incorporating Pro Bono 
Into Their Lives Talk About its Rewards, Challenges, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/working_for_free/. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jessica Lussenhop, After Years in Prison, Angel Stewart and Other Victims 
of Violence Ask for Mercy, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2015/03/after_years_in_prison_angel_stewar
t_and_other_victims_of_violence_ask_for_mercy.php?page=all. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Ward, supra note 141. 
 146. Id. 
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and told her, “Go ahead, I could use the money.”147  Donna turned the loaded 
gun on her husband, believing he would kill her if she did not kill herself.148 
At trial, a psychologist testified that Donna exhibited the psychological 
effects of spousal abuse, and Donna’s public defender argued that the murder 
was the result of years of abuse.149  Despite the psychologist’s testimony, 
multiple orders of protection Donna took out against her husband and several 
police reports were excluded as evidence by the trial judge.150  After forty 
hours of deliberation, a Greene County jury found Donna guilty of murder in 
the second degree and armed criminal action.151  Donna was sentenced to 
twenty years in the Chillicothe Correctional Center.152 
B.  Amelia Bird 
Amelia Bird was sixteen at the time of her parents’ shooting in 2005.153  
Amelia confided in her ex-boyfriend, Chad Brantley, prior to the shooting 
and revealed that she had been suffering extensive physical and sexual abuse 
at the hands of her father and brother.154  One night, Chad entered Amelia’s 
home while everyone was sleeping and shot Amelia’s parents.155  The shots 
killed Amelia’s mother and seriously wounded her father.156  
The State charged Chad with first-degree murder and sought the death 
penalty against him.157  Amelia was charged as a co-conspirator in the death 
of her mother,158 and she was certified and charged as an adult.159  Out of fear 
that the State would seek the death penalty against her as well, Amelia pled 
guilty to murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree.160  She 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Associated Press, Springfield Woman Found Guilty of Killing Husband, 
HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 24, 2006, at 2A, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=
1906&dat=20061224&id=h30jAAAAIBAJ&sjid=F9kEAAAAIBAJ&pg=3763,70041
72&hl=en. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Associated Press, supra note 149. 
 152. Ward, supra note 141. 
 153. Amelia Bird, Charged in Mother’s Murder, To Trial in February 2009, 
HOUS. HERALD (Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Amelia Bird Charged], http://www.
houstonherald.com/news/amelia-bird-charged-in-mother-s-murder-to-trial-in/article_
02bd08ad-c568-554d-b779-b1c2ea274663.html. 
 154. Rachel Lippmann, Coalition Calls on Nixon to Ease Sentences of Abuse 
Victims, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/
post/coalition-calls-nixon-ease-sentences-abuse-victims. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Amelia Bird Charged, supra note 153. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Kathee Baird, Amelia Bird And Chad Brantley Sentenced To Consecutive 
Life Sentences For The Death Of Bird’s Mother, CRIME SCENE, http://crimescene
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was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.161  Because Amelia pled 
guilty and did not stand trial, she was unable to present evidence of the sexual 
and physical abuse she had endured for years or BWS expert testimony to 
demonstrate how that abuse had affected her.162 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
BWS, and Walker’s work to define and better understand it, is an im-
portant contribution to criminal law and the understanding of a battered 
woman’s psyche.163  Expert witnesses are now able to aid judges and juries in 
understanding how battered women act and how they perceive imminent 
danger – observations that may not be apparent to a factfinder.164  Expert 
testimony assists judges and juries in implementing BWS and finding that, 
given the attributes of BWS, the woman actually killed her abuser in self-
defense.  Expert testimony regarding BWS faces many limitations – the trial 
court judge’s discretion in determining whether the evidence is admissible 
and the jury’s ability to find that a battered woman acted reasonably in the 
face of imminent danger.  These limitations have caused unjust and excessive 
sentences to battered women, such as Donna Biernacki and Amelia Bird, who 
were unable to benefit from Section 563.033. 
A.  The Necessity of Expert Testimony Regarding Battered Woman 
Syndrome 
Self-defense law is posited on the idea that one who is unlawfully at-
tacked should be able to defend herself by reasonable means.165  Self-defense 
is meant to apply to everyone equally, no matter his or her gender, yet tradi-
tional self-defense was not created with battered women in mind.166  Section 
563.031 does not contemplate the cycle of violence of battering relationships 
and a battered woman’s reasonable belief that there is always a threat that her 
partner will use unlawful force.167  Traditional self-defense developed with 
two scenarios, based on the experiences of men, in mind: where a stranger 
suddenly attacks a person and where two people, of proximate size and 
 
investigations.blogspot.com/2009/02/amelia-bird-and-chad-brantley-sentenced.html 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Note that Section 563.033 does not require that a battered woman be a 
spouse of the batterer.  State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).  
Therefore, Amelia was still eligible to present BWS expert testimony at trial. 
 163. See generally Dutton, supra note 23, at 1194–95. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Cheryl A. Terrance et al., Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Battered 
Women Who Kill: Going Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome, 88 N.D. L. REV. 
921, 926 (2012). 
 166. See id. at 926–27. 
 167. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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strength, get into some sort of brawl.168  Section 563.033 was passed into law 
so that battered women could avail themselves of self-defense, despite its 
traditional, male-centered criteria. 
In most states, including Missouri, a woman is justified in using deadly 
force if she reasonably believes the force is necessary to prevent a threat of 
force or the use of unlawful deadly force.169  Because of the reality of domes-
tic violence and BWS, many battered women face difficulty in successfully 
asserting each element of self-defense.170  Traditional self-defense does not 
apply to situations where a woman responds with physical force several hours 
after a physical attack, when her abusive partner is sleeping, or when he has 
turned his back in retreat from an attack.171  Even if a woman is able to jump 
the hurdle that is the imminence requirement of self-defense, “she must still 
convince the jury that her belief of imminent danger or serious injury, and her 
response to that danger, was reasonable.”172 
When expert testimony is admitted, judges and jurors become better 
equipped to evaluate the perspective of a battered woman and determine 
whether, in light of BWS, it was reasonable for her to respond with deadly 
force.  In nonconfrontational circumstances, where a factfinder is less likely 
to see the threat or use of deadly force, experts can explain why the woman 
had a different view of imminence and appropriate force.  Sometimes, behav-
iors contrary to what laypeople would expect of a battered woman represent a 
common response in the cycle of violence.173  In short, “[E]xpert testimony 
helps explain how and why the battered woman fits into traditional self-
defense doctrine.”174  While BWS is not a defense to homicide, it, with the 
help of expert testimony, can encapsulate and give context to self-defense in 
the terms and experiences of a battered woman. 
Despite the help expert testimony offers to factfinders, the decision of 
whether to admit expert testimony is dependent on the trial judge’s discretion.  
This is contrary to the stated purpose of Section 563.033.175  Trial courts have 
excluded BWS expert testimony on the grounds that it is irrelevant, that it 
“invades the province of the jury by speaking to matters in which the jury is 
as competent as the expert,” and that scientific knowledge of BWS is not 
 
 168. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1575–76; see Ter-
rance et al., supra note 165. 
 169. See Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1576. 
 170. Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the 
Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 711 (1994). 
 171. Susan R. Estrich, Defending Women Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, 
Self-Defense and the Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1433 (1990). 
 172. Terrance et al., supra note 165, at 929. 
 173. Id. at 952–53. 
 174. Id. at 933. 
 175. See Brewer, supra note 50 (stating the legislative intent in passing Section 
563.033 was “to remove the decision whether to admit expert testimony on ‘battered 
spouse syndrome’ from the trial judge’s discretion”). 
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sufficiently developed.176  For example, in 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that BWS expert testimony was inadmissible be-
cause the defendant, who had been repeatedly sexually assaulted by her fa-
ther, was the initial aggressor and did not meet the required elements of self-
defense.177  Had BWS expert testimony been admitted at her trial, the jury 
could have considered the abuse and determined that the defendant was in 
fact acting in self-defense.178   
Additionally, judges may view BWS expert testimony “through the lens 
of their own common assumptions” and may be more likely to exclude BWS 
expert testimony when a woman commits a nonconfrontational act of self-
defense.179  Even if the trial judge decides to admit some evidence of BWS, a 
jury must believe the woman is suffering from BWS before weighing the 
evidence “in light of how an otherwise reasonable person who is suffering 
from [BWS] would have perceived and reacted.”180 
B.  Redefining Battered Woman Syndrome 
Although Section 563.033 was passed into law nearly three decades ago 
in an effort to aid battered women in their self-defense claims, whether the 
statute is actually a benefit to battered women remains unclear.181  BWS was 
created to describe the common characteristics of a battering relationship, but 
BWS is not a one-size-fits-all explanation of the effects of battering.182  Many 
scholars are of the opinion that BWS inadequately captures the complex dy-
namics of domestic violence and the cycle of violence.183   
 
 176. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1582–85. 
 177. See generally Lannert v. Jones, 321 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 178. Governor Matt Blunt commuted the defendant’s life without parole sentence 
in 2009.  Matt Sanders, Blunt Commutes Sentence of Convicted Scott County Murder-
er, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.semissourian.com/story/
1492444.html. 
 179. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 
109 (2008); see also Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, supra note 4, at 1577; 
Thomas H. Limbrick, Note, Lactation Intolerance: Trivializing the Struggles of 
Working Mothers & the Need for a More Diverse Judiciary, 80 MO. L. REV. 1189, 
1201–02 (2015) (quoting Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit 
Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 300 (2014), 
http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/7Negowetti_Final_Germano_Clean.pdf) 
(“Ideally, judges use the facts and evidence of a case before them, in the context of 
legal precedent, to reach their decisions; however, ‘Regardless of conscious or 
avowed biases and prejudices, most people . . . harbor some implicit biases.’”). 
 180. State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 181. See Brewer, supra note 50; see also Terrance et al., supra note 165, at 935. 
 182. See Irvin B. Nodland, Defending Battered Women: Everything She Says May 
Be Used Against Them, 68 N.D. L. REV. 131, 132 (1992). 
 183. Terrance et al., supra note 165, at 941. 
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BWS suggests that battered women only act pursuant to a rigid cycle of 
three phases and that an alternative reaction is outside the scope of BWS and 
may be due to the woman’s will or a mental deficiency, not the learned help-
lessness she has developed after years of abuse.184  When evidence of BWS is 
presented, juries may be faced with a stereotypical paradigm of who a bat-
tered woman is and how she is expected to act according to the cycle of vio-
lence.185  Because abuse does not affect all battered women in the same way 
and does not always incorporate the attributes of Walker’s BWS, factfinders 
may decline to find self-defense when a battered woman was indeed acting as 
a reasonable battered woman in her situation would. 
Additionally, there is concern that reference to Battered Woman Syn-
drome leads factfinders to view a battered woman as pathological; however, 
BWS is not meant to present some sort of mental disease or defect defense.186   
While expert testimony regarding BWS is meant to aid a jury in understand-
ing why a battered woman acted the way that she did, general testimony re-
garding a woman’s inability to leave an abusive relationship or her feeling of 
imminent danger may depict a woman as too mentally unstable or impaired to 
act as an “otherwise reasonable person” suffering from BWS would act.187  In 
a jury simulation study, researchers discovered that mock jurors, utilizing 
expert testimony regarding BWS in a case where a woman killed her abusive 
partner, did not return different verdicts than mock jurors who were not pre-
sented with expert testimony.188  The mock jurors who were presented with 
expert testimony “viewed the defendant as ‘having less capacity for responsi-
ble choice and as being more distorted in her thinking.’”189  The jury simula-
tion study found that “if the defendant does not depict the typical/passive 
battered woman, then the defendant’s use of expert testimony regarding the 
syndrome may not be a successful strategy.”190 
Expert testimony regarding BWS should focus on the particular behav-
ioral traits and signs and symptoms of physical, sexual, or psychological 
abuse as it relates to a particular battered woman defendant – not all battered 
women in general.  Because BWS is not a one-size-fits-all explanation of the 
traits of battered women, expert testimony should reflect how the battered 
woman on trial acted and reacted, as well as why these events were a reason-
 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. at 945. 
 186. See id. at 941, 943; see also Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little 
Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 155, 170 (2004) (“[U]se of the term ‘syndrome’ has clinical connota-
tions and is therefore prone to generate confusion.”). 
 187. Krause, supra note 170, at 716. 
 188. Terrance et al., supra note 165, at 942. 
 189. Id. (citing Norman J. Finkel et al., The Self-Defense Defense and Community 
Sentiment, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 585, 598 (1991)). 
 190. Id. at 946–47 (quoting Brenda L. Russell & Linda S. Melillo, Attitudes To-
ward Battered Women Who Kill: Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability, 
33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219, 239 (2006)). 
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able response to the abuse she suffered.  Such an explanation gives better 
effect to the standard announced in State v. Edwards and allows juries to 
evaluate how an otherwise reasonable woman suffering from BWS would 
have reacted in the accused battered woman’s circumstances.  Such a subjec-
tive offering of expert testimony avoids juries’ misconceptions and stereo-
types. 
C.  Clemency Is an Appropriate Remedy for Convicted Battered  
Women 
Clemency is necessary to right the wrongs of Missouri trial courts in ap-
plying and giving effect to Section 563.033.  Professor Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der argues clemency “will continue to be necessary as long as individuals are 
denied rights to present an adequate defense at trial and until society responds 
adequately to the problem of woman abuse.”191  Clemency is meant to reme-
dy unjust sentences as a sign of mercy from the governor.  Clemency should 
not be counted on as the cure for all battered women who are convicted at 
trial, but should instead be exercised when a battered woman’s status as a 
victim of extensive domestic violence does not mitigate her sentence. 
Clemency has become a very political means of intervention, and the 
number of petitions for clemency granted has declined in the past two dec-
ades.192  Several studies have revealed that conviction and incarceration rates 
are higher for female domestic violence victims than all others charged with 
homicide.193  Additionally, female victims of domestic violence face longer 
sentences.194  These studies reflect the fact that judges and juries do not nec-
essarily view a battered woman as a victim who is deserving of a mitigated 
sentence.  Instead, several battered women are treated more harshly – either 
because they did not fit the narrow BWS definition of a battered woman or 
because the factfinder was unable to view the woman’s actions as reasonable 
and as a result of an imminent threat. 
Although trial courts have increasingly admitted expert testimony re-
garding BWS and past governors have commuted life sentences of battered 
women, “progress has not . . . been linear.”195  Several women have fallen 
through the cracks of the criminal justice system, including Donna Biernacki 
and Amelia Bird.   
 
 191. Ammons, supra note 101, at 535 (quoting ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, 
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 145 (2000)). 
 192. Carol Jacobsen & Lora Bex Lempert, Institutional Disparities: Considera-
tions of Gender in the Commutation Process for Incarcerated Women, 39 SIGNS 265, 
265 (2013). 
 193. Id. at 267. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Amelia’s ex-boyfriend decided to take matters into his own hands in an 
act of vigilante justice.196  While Amelia had no role in the murder, and it has 
never been suggested that she in fact committed the murder, her defense 
counsel advised her to plead guilty because of the threat of death.197  Amelia 
was threatened with the death penalty as a sixteen-year-old girl – a penalty 
that would have been mitigated if Amelia went to trial and presented BWS 
expert testimony.   
Donna was disadvantaged by the immense amount of discretion prac-
ticed by the trial court judge.  The judge excluded several pieces of evidence 
– past protective orders and a number of police reports – that were crucial for 
the jury to determine whether Donna suffered from BWS.198  Additionally, 
expert testimony regarding BWS was brief and did not speak to the percep-
tions and reactions of a woman suffering from BWS.199  Although some evi-
dence of BWS was presented at Donna’s trial, the exclusion of other relevant 
BWS evidence restricted the jury’s ability to fully understand Donna’s ac-
tions in light of the battering she experienced throughout her marriage.  Don-
na and Amelia’s status as victims, or rather survivors, of domestic violence 
did not mitigate the harsh sentences they received.  It is within Governor 
Nixon’s power to right this wrong. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
BWS has long been recognized as a psychological theory that aids bat-
tered women in making a claim of self-defense.  The importance of BWS 
testimony in Missouri was recognized in 1987 with the passage of Section 
563.033, but it has not appeared to benefit many battered women.  The ad-
missibility of BWS evidence is subject to the vast discretion of the trial court 
and the scrutiny of the jury, who must look past the stereotypical battered 
woman paradigm in order to understand why the battered woman defendant 
perceived and reacted in the way that she did.  
Expert testimony regarding BWS should focus on the battered woman 
who is facing trial, detailing her reactions to the abuse she has suffered.  To 
group the traits of all battered women into one single definition is to deprive 
other women, who similarly faced horrendous abuse, of the ability to claim 
self-defense.  BWS should not be a one-size-fits-all explanation, and it is 
imperative that an expert present evidence as to why a particular battered 
woman acted in the particular way that she did. 
 
 196. See Lippmann, supra note 154. 
 197. See BREAKING: Bird Pleads Guilty, Receives Two Life Sentences, HOUS. 
HERALD (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.houstonherald.com/news/breaking-bird-pleads-
guilty-receives-two-life-sentences/article_6407cb62-e093-5aee-ab46-
49124e5c6540.html. 
 198. Liz Ramsey, Petitioning Governor Jeremiah Nixon, Grant Clemency for 14 
Women in Missouri Prisons, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/jeremiah-
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Section 563.033 is, no doubt, meant to benefit battered women, but its 
delayed implementation has caused many women – who would have been 
able to successfully plead a case of self-defense with the help of BWS expert 
testimony – to receive harsher sentences than others convicted of similar 
crimes.  Governor Nixon has the ability to mitigate these harsh sentences by 
granting clemency, a power only he can exercise.  Donna Biernacki, Amelia 
Bird, and several unnamed others should have been able to present BWS ex-
pert testimony at trial and successfully plead a case of self-defense.  Judges 
and juries failed to treat these women as victims and for that, justice demands 
Governor Nixon’s mercy. 
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